Decoding the safety culture ladder (Part 1): Five levels of organisational maturity 

As the global energy landscape transforms to meet climate challenges, emerging sectors like offshore wind, solar, and hydrogen are experiencing rapid growth. Understanding where these industries stand on the journey to safety excellence requires a proven framework. The “safety culture ladder” model, while rooted in traditional energy, offers valuable insights for organisations in the energy transition who aim to prevent a major incident that could set back industry progress for a decade. 

This article is the first of a three-part series that introduces the safety culture ladder and discusses its application in the energy transition.

Introduction

The concept of safety culture is relatively new. It was first formally defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1986, following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. In the aftermath of this catastrophic event, investigations revealed that organisational and cultural factors significantly contributed to the accident, prompting a need to focus on these issues. 

One widely used definition of safety culture was developed in 1993 by the Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI): “The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organisation’s health and safety management.” (Ref. 1). 

Four years later, Professor James Reason offered a more accessible definition: “An informed culture where people understand the hazards and risks involved in their work, and everyone accepts their role in maintaining safety.” (Ref. 2). This definition emphasises the importance of awareness, shared responsibility, and proactive safety management at all levels of an organisation. 

One of the most influential models for understanding organisational safety culture was developed by Professors Patrick Hudson and Dianne Parker in 2006 (Ref. 3), further funded by Shell, and available today as a toolkit from the Energy Institute (Ref. 4). The “safety culture ladder” was originally created to help oil and gas companies self-assess their current level of safety culture and climb the ladder to a higher level of performance.  

The model’s enduring relevance lies in its ability to capture the essence of how organisations think about safety, from the most basic “who cares?” attitude to the most sophisticated generative approach where safety is fully integrated into every aspect of operations. As energy transition sectors mature, understanding these cultural levels becomes crucial for sustainable development. 

The five levels of safety culture

The model describes five distinct levels of cultural maturity, each representing a fundamentally different way of thinking about and managing safety (see Figure 1). As an organisation progresses up the ladder, it becomes more informed – “we know what’s going on around here” – and more trusting –  “we trust each other to tell the truth and do what must be done”.

Figure 1 – The safety culture ladder (from Ref. 4) 

Pathological – “Who cares as long as we’re not caught”

The pathological level represents the most basic and least developed safety culture. “Accidents happen, we operate in a dangerous industry”. 

Management views safety as a burden and waste of resources. The focus is solely on avoiding trouble with regulators and there is minimal investment in safety systems. Following an incident, management seeks someone to blame – usually a front-line operator – “They should have been more careful – it’s their own fault”. Production and profit are the only real priorities. 

Workers fear reporting incidents in case of punishment – “Just hide that before the supervisor comes”. Safety concerns are ignored, and safety shortcuts are encouraged or tolerated. Training is minimal or a tick-box exercise at best, and there is constant pressure to maintain production. 

There is limited or no safety communication, with top-down directives only. Incidents are hidden where possible, messaging is blame-focused, and responses are defensive to any concerns. 

Reactive – “Safety is important. We do a lot every time we have an accident” 

At the reactive level, organisations begin to take safety seriously, but only in response to incidents. “Let’s implement a new rule to prevent this from happening again”. 

For management, safety becomes important after incidents. Rules and procedures proliferate, and basic safety systems are implemented. Investment in safety is reactive, and there is a short-term focus on immediate issues. 

Workers begin to follow safety rules but only out of fear. Incident reporting increases and basic training is provided. Safety is seen as following rules – “Great, more paperwork to fill out” – and concerns are raised cautiously. 

There is increased communication of safety messages after incidents. The focus is on rules and compliance. Incident investigations are still blame-focused – “Who’s responsible for this accident? We need accountability”. There is limited two-way dialogue. 

Calculative – “We have systems in place to manage all hazards” 

The calculative level represents a significant step forward, with systematic management of safety. “Our incident rates are down 5% this quarter”. 

Safety is managed through systems and data. Formal management systems are put in place, with good statistics and metrics tracking, and regular audits and reviews – “The safety audit showed we’re at 85% compliance”. Investment is made in safety infrastructure. 

Workers have clear procedures to follow and are supported by regular safety training. “I need to do my safety checklist before starting”. Incident reporting is encouraged. Safety committees and forums are established and encourage workforce participation. 

Communication of safety is achieved by regular safety meetings and metric-focused reporting. There is a systematic flow of information. Formal feedback channels are available, and safety communication is generally very professional. 

Proactive – “Safety leadership and values drive continuous improvement” 

At the proactive level, organisations begin to anticipate and prevent problems. “What are your thoughts on how we can make this process safer?” 

Leadership shows real commitment, with a continuous improvement mindset. The perspective is long-term, and safety is integrated into strategy. The focus is on prevention. “I appreciate you raising that safety concern, let’s look into it together”. 

Workers actively participate in safety, are empowered to raise concerns, and engage in improvements. “I feel comfortable raising safety concerns with my supervisor”. Advanced safety training is in place. Workers take pride in safety performance. 

Communication is an open two-way dialogue, cross-functional and safety input is appreciated. Best practices are shared, and near-misses provide learning opportunities – “Let’s share what we learned from this near-miss with other departments”. 

Generative – “Safety is how we do business around here” 

The generative level represents the most mature safety culture, and the characteristics echo those of the high reliability organisation (Ref. 5) – “What might we be missing in our safety systems?” Such organisations operate high risk technologies but nevertheless cope well with the associated hazards and have good safety performance records. 

Managers ensure safety is fully integrated into operations. There is a “chronic unease” about risks, a wariness that something is being overlooked especially when things appear to be running smoothly. A balanced approach is taken to all risks – “How can we help you make your job safer?” Innovative solutions in safety management are sought, involving front-line workers. Resilient systems thinking is commonplace, ensuring systems are designed and managed to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and recover from disruptions or unexpected events. 

Workers are fully empowered in safety and active participation is normal. “Safety isn’t just management’s job – it’s everyone’s responsibility”. A collective responsibility is felt, continuous learning is valued, and there is a pride in the organisation’s safety culture. 

Communication is open and transparent and multi-directional. Safety discussions are rich in insights, with shared understanding. Constructive challenge and bad news are welcomed. 

Current maturity in energy transition sectors

Almost all operating companies in mature energy sectors like the UK oil and gas industry for example, will be at least at the calculative level and many at the proactive level, with some striving for a generative culture. The less mature energy transition sectors present a more complex picture. Their position often reflects their industry heritage, operational complexity, and stage of development. 

The offshore wind sector typically operates between reactive and calculative levels, with some organisations pushing into proactive territory. The sector benefits from offshore oil and gas experience and established maritime safety culture, as well as an onshore wind track record. There is potential for a major accident and hence a strong regulatory framework (Ref. 6). There is a generally good systematic approach to safety, a growing safety professional capacity and industry standards are emerging.

The solar sector shows greater variation in safety culture maturity at utility scale, perhaps due in part to its lower risk profile. The more experienced organisations are at the reactive to calculative levels, with other organisations including the supply chain more generally reactive. Systematic approaches are in place, with contractor management and professional safety management. A growing challenge for solar projects is the introduction of lithium-ion battery energy storage systems (BESS), with their unique fire and explosion risks (see Ref. 7 for example). 

The emerging hydrogen sector typically starts at calculative level due to its industrial heritage, having a strong process safety focus from its oil, gas and chemical origins. There is a good understanding of hydrogen hazards and established safety systems, supported by ongoing research, technical and risk assessment competence. The sector faces challenges in the form of rapid growth, new player entries, scale-up pressures, novel applications, and evolving technology. Furthermore, targeted engagement activities are needed to bridge the gap between the public’s current perception of hydrogen as a new, dangerous technology and its reality as an established industrial gas with significant potential for safe, clean energy applications.

Assessing the organisation’s current level

Organisations can use multiple complementary methods to determine their safety culture level. Formal assessment tools include safety culture surveys and questionnaires (such as Ref. 4), independent safety culture audits, and focus groups and structured interviews.  

These can be supported by assessment of leadership practices such as the quality of management walk-arounds, safety considerations in decision-making, resource allocation to safety, and communication patterns. Insights can also be gleaned from operational indicators like incident reporting rates and quality, near-miss reporting frequency, investigation depth and follow-through, corrective action completion rates and training effectiveness measures. 

When assessing the current level of safety culture, the assessment team should be aware of several common pitfalls:

• Organisational “split personalities”: Organisations can exist at multiple levels simultaneously, for example, variations may be observed across different departments, day and night shifts, different locations, contractors versus staff, and management versus worker perspectives. This creates a “safety culture schizophrenia” that causes confusion and undermines cultural consistency. 
• “Cultural tourism”: Some leaders visit higher levels but don’t live there – they give great safety speeches but don’t walk the talk. They are like tourists who visit a country but don’t attempt at all to learn the language or embrace the cultural differences. Inevitably they revert to lower levels when under pressure. 
• The “facade effect”: Here, the organisation can look good in audits and display positive metrics. However, it is surface-level compliance, with audit-ready performance only and the good metrics hide underlying problems. It is a paper system without practice and can be common in calculative organisations focusing on appearance over substance. 
• The “safety theatre effect”: This is the phenomenon where the organisation focuses on highly visible but low-risk safety issues (like coffee cup lids, mandatory handrail use, reverse parking, and trivial safety moments) while neglecting more serious but less visible risks.  This misplaced focus stems from a desire to demonstrate visible safety commitment rather than understand risk-based prioritisation. It creates an illusion of safety consciousness, undermining authentic safety culture by breeding cynicism among workers (especially engineers) who recognise the disconnect between trivial rules and unaddressed serious risks. 
• The “calculative trap”: Many organisations become stuck at the calculative level. They become obsessed with numbers and metrics, and create impressive-looking spreadsheets and dashboards, but never make the leap to truly caring about the safety of their people. It is like tracking personal health metrics but without making any lifestyle changes. 

Conclusion

The safety culture ladder serves as both a diagnostic tool and development roadmap for organisations in energy transition sectors. Understanding both the levels and assessment challenges is crucial for meaningful progress. 

While most energy transition organisations currently operate between reactive and calculative levels, the variation between sectors can be significant, reflecting their different origins, operational contexts, and maturity levels.  

As these sectors continue to mature, accurate cultural assessment becomes increasingly important. Organisations must look beyond surface metrics to develop authentic safety cultures that mitigate the risk of a major incident that could derail industry momentum for a decade. Such advanced safety cultures will support sustainable growth through the energy transition journey.

The second article in this safety culture series will focus on how organisations at different cultural levels think about personal safety versus major accident hazards. 

The third article will round off the series by addressing the concept of safety as a value, and how it evolves as an organisation moves up the safety culture ladder.

References 

1. Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI), (1993). Organising for Safety. 
2. Reason, J. (1997). Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. 
3. Parker, D., Lawrie, M., and Hudson, P.T.W. (2006). A framework for understanding the development of organisational safety culture. 
4. Understanding your HSE culture. https://heartsandminds.energyinst.org/ 
5. Weick, K. E. (1987). Organizational Culture as a Source of High Reliability. California Management Review, 29(2), 112-127. 
6. Ellor, G., Funnell, L., and Lewis, S., (2024). Towards a unified approach – Guidance for applying CDM 2015 to offshore wind. 
7. Cairn Risk. Volts and vulnerabilities: Exploring the hazards of battery energy storage systems.