Decoding the safety culture ladder (Part 2): A tale of two risks in the energy transition

In energy transition sectors, organisations face two distinct types of safety risks: personal safety incidents that typically affect individuals, and major accident hazards that could cause multiple fatalities or catastrophic environmental damage. How organisations think about and manage these different risks provides deep insight into their safety culture maturity.

This article is the second of a three-part series that introduces the safety culture ladder and discusses its application in the energy transition.

Introduction

The distinction between personal safety and major accident safety is crucial for organisations in energy transition sectors, where novel technologies and rapidly evolving operational environments create complex risk landscapes. Personal safety incidents, while potentially serious, typically affect individuals through slips, falls, strikes, and similar accidents. Major accident hazards, conversely, have the potential for multiple fatalities, significant environmental damage, or catastrophic asset loss. Understanding how organisations at different cultural levels think about these distinct risks is essential for effective risk management.

Personal safety and major accident safety – the differences

There are distinct differences between personal safety and major accident safety, summarised in Table 1 and described below.

Table 1 – The differences between personal and major accident safety

Nature and scale of impact

Personal safety typically affects individuals through incidents like slips, trips, falls, cuts, strains, or being struck by objects. Even serious incidents usually impact one or few individuals. Many personal safety hazards are common across industrial sites, for instance, electricity, working at height, manual handling, and suspended loads.

Major accident hazards have the potential for multiple fatalities, catastrophic environmental and asset damage. They tend to be specific to the industrial sector and individual asset. For example, catastrophic structural failure of a wind turbine during extreme weather, thermal runaway at a battery storage system leading to an uncontrolled fire and toxic gas release, or major fire involving the DC electrical system of a solar plant.

Frequency and visibility

Personal safety is associated with higher frequency events that are immediately visible and directly experienced. The consequences are clear and understood. Conversely, major accidents are low frequency but high consequence events. They often have precursor indicators that can be subtle or complex to interpret.

Risk assessment

Personal safety risks are generally straightforward to identify and assess. Incidents often occur due to simple causes. Major accident hazards, however, require sophisticated risk assessment techniques applied by experienced technical specialists. Major accidents arise from complex chains of equipment, procedural and human failures.

Control measures

Personal safety controls tend to be simpler and more direct, for instance, personal protective equipment, procedures, and physical barriers. Success is immediately observable. On the other hand, major accident hazards require multiple layers of protection including technical, operational and organisational controls. Effectiveness can be harder to verify.

Monitoring and measurement

Personal safety performance is easy to measure through incident rates, observation data, and direct feedback. The metrics are clear, and trends can be observed. Major accident hazards are far more challenging to monitor. The emphasis is on leading indicators of potential system failures. Success means nothing happens.

Response and recovery

An immediate response is possible for personal safety incidents. The protocols are clear and recovery times short. Major accidents require complex emergency response plans, involve potentially long-term consequences and extensive recovery efforts.

Cultural aspects

Personal safety is more intuitive for workers to understand, is directly relevant to them, and many will have personal experience of incidents. Major accident safety, however, can seem abstract or theoretical. It requires deep technical expertise, sustained awareness and systematic thinking.

Understanding these differences is crucial for developing appropriate risk management strategies that address both types of safety effectively.

The safety culture ladder

The first article in this series introduced the safety culture ladder (Ref. 1). Developed by Hudson and Parker, the model effectively encapsulates how organisations approach safety. It provides a framework for companies to evaluate their current safety culture and progress towards higher levels of performance, as depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1 – The safety culture ladder (from Ref. 2)

At the lowest level of maturity, pathological, safety is seen as a problem caused by workers. The focus is on avoiding getting caught by regulators. At the reactive level, safety becomes important after accidents occur. The organisation deals with hazards as they arise. A common level in high hazard sectors is calculative, where safety is managed through systems and processes. Data collection and metrics drive decisions. Next is the proactive level, where the organisation actively looks for and tries to anticipate safety problems before they occur. The most advanced state is generative, where safety is integrated into every aspect of the business. Everyone is empowered to act on safety concerns.

As organisations progress up the ladder, they demonstrate increasingly sophisticated approaches to both personal safety and major accident safety, as summarised in Figure 2 and discussed below.

Figure 2 – Personal versus major accident safety: A comparative view across the safety culture ladder

Pathological level: “Who cares?”

At this lowest level of safety culture, safety is viewed as an inconvenient burden to be avoided rather than a fundamental organisational responsibility.

Personal safety: Organisations show minimal concern for personal safety. Worksite incidents are seen as an inevitable part of the job and blame is focused entirely on workers for doing the wrong thing. Consequently, incidents are frequently hidden or unreported and unsafe situations are ignored. Minimal protective equipment is provided, and training is minimal or non-existent – cost is considered more important than safety

Major accident safety: The approach to major accident hazards is even more concerning. There is a complete denial of catastrophic potential, with no consideration of worst-case scenarios. Near-misses involving system or process safety are ignored and risk assessments are superficial at best. Technical controls are minimal or degraded and emergency response capabilities lacking. Maintenance is reactive, only fixing equipment once it fails.

Behavioural signs: Incidents are hidden from authorities, as the organisation hopes to avoid getting caught. Safety systems are bypassed, basic safety rules not followed, and warning signs ignored. Corners are cut to save money, with workers pressured to take risks.

It is highly unlikely there are pathological organisations operating in the energy transition sectors in countries with strong safety regulations.

Reactive level: “Safety after the event”

The reactive approach treats safety as a reactive problem to be solved after incidents occur, rather than a proactive system to be continuously managed.

Personal safety: Organisations react strongly to personal injuries. Response to incidents is immediate, simple fixes are quickly applied and new rules created. Basic personal protective equipment (PPE) programmes are implemented, and basic workplace safety training provided. Incident tracking is initiated but the focus is always short-term and on immediate issues.

Major accident safety: Major accident risk typically gets attention only after industry disasters. Basic barrier management strategies are started and simple emergency plans created. There is minimal system/process safety investment and maintenance programmes are focused on fixing breakdowns. Risk assessments are surface-level and there is limited technical expertise.

Behavioural signs: There is a rush to implement new rules, with a focus on immediate fixes. Incident investigations are blame-oriented. There is a temporary increase in attention but a quick return to old habits.

Calculative level: “Systems control risk”

At the calculative level, safety transitions from a reactive response to a systematic, metrics-driven approach that prioritises process and compliance over genuine cultural transformation.

Personal safety: A systematic approach to personal safety emerges. Formal hazard assessment processes are introduced. Detailed safety procedures are implemented, supported by comprehensive training programmes. Incident investigations are thorough. Performance metrics are tracked and safety audits conducted regularly.

Major accident safety: System/process safety receives systematic attention. Technical risk assessments are performed. Barrier management systems are introduced, emergency preparedness plans developed, preventive maintenance programmes established, and management systems implemented. System/process safety metrics are tracked and technical expertise developed.

Behavioural signs: Regular safety meetings are held, with metric-focused discussions. Approaches are system-based and actions procedure-driven. The mindset is mainly compliance focused.

Many organisations remain entrenched at the calculative level, fixated on collecting data and generating detailed spreadsheets and dashboards. While these tools may appear impressive, they often fail to translate into meaningful actions that demonstrate genuine care for the safety and well-being of their people. It is akin to monitoring personal health metrics obsessively but neglecting to make the necessary lifestyle changes to improve overall health.

Proactive level: “Looking for problems”

The proactive level represents a fundamental shift from managing safety as a compliance requirement to actively seeking, understanding, and preventing potential risks before they materialise.

Personal safety: Organisations actively seek to prevent personal injuries. Behavioural safety programmes are implemented, with worker engagement initiatives and learning teams established. There is a focus on leading indicators and prevention. Innovation in controls is encouraged, with an emphasis on continuous improvement.

Major accident safety: Major accident prevention becomes sophisticated. The performance of critical controls is monitored closely, and a strong response is taken to weak signals. Scenario-based planning is introduced, and “systems thinking” is prevalent – viewing safety as an interconnected web of plant, people, processes, and environments, rather than isolating issues into silos. Much is learned from other industries. Technical authorities are empowered and respected, and there is significant investment in prevention.

Behavioural signs: An active search for risks, employee involvement, learning from near-misses, sharing best practices, and challenging assumptions.

Generative level: “Safety is core”

At the generative level, safety transcends being a management system and becomes an intrinsic, collective organisational value that is continuously learned, challenged, and improved.

Personal safety: Personal safety is fully integrated into operations. It is a natural part of work planning. Workers feel a collective responsibility and empowerment is normal. Safety discussions are rich in insights, with peer-to-peer learning and an expectation of excellence. Innovation is continuous.

Major accident safety: There is a sophisticated understanding of major accident risk. “Chronic unease” is maintained – a proactive alertness to potential hidden or emerging risks – even with multiple protection layers in place, along with strong operational discipline and in-built system resilience. Assumptions are regularly tested, and technical challenge welcomed. Significant investment is sustained.

Behavioural signs: Vigilance is constant, communication open, and intervention proactive. System thinking is normal, as is continuous learning.

While truly generative organisations are rare, some industries and companies that come closest include high-reliability organisations like NASA’s current space programmes, advanced aviation safety teams, and some cutting-edge nuclear power organisations.

“Safety theatre” and the misallocation of focus

A significant challenge in safety culture development is the phenomenon of “safety theatre” – where organisations focus disproportionately on highly visible but lower-risk issues while neglecting more serious hazards.

Some common examples include excessive focus and enforcement of reverse parking policies, lids on coffee cups, holding the handrail, and safety moments consuming 15 minutes of every meeting. Other manifestations include detailed PPE rules for low-risk tasks, extensive reporting requirements for minor incidents, and multiple signatures required for simple safety procedures.

Illustration generated by OpenAI’s DALL·E through ChatGPT

The belief behind such rules is that they build “safety mindset” habits that transfer to other situations, create constant safety awareness, and demonstrate organisational commitment to safety. Paradoxically, in practice, these well-intentioned safety efforts increase organisational vulnerability by creating an illusion of control through seemingly objective safety indicators. It is much easier to count safety moments than it is to address complex systemic risks. The approach provides a false sense of comprehensive risk management by neglecting substantive risk reduction strategies.

So why do organisations fall into the safety theatre trap? The key reason is probably a visibility bias – these are easy-to-observe behaviours and the fixes simple, quick to introduce and low cost. Leadership feels proactive and that it is demonstrating commitment, but the effort can be superficial and without meaningful investment. The rules create the impression of action in enhancing safety culture and yet represent a fundamental misunderstanding of safety culture’s true nature.

The approach does not improve genuine safety, with missed opportunities for substantive risk reduction. There is an erosion of credibility with the workforce. Site workers who undertake the most hazardous tasks fear that safety is being trivialised. Office-based planners and designers become cynical when they observe a lack of resources for major hazard controls, as they know the potential for catastrophic incidents exists despite good personal safety statistics.

The transition from safety theatre to authentic safety culture represents a profound organisational challenge. It requires challenging existing mental models, confronting uncomfortable truths about risk, and developing more sophisticated approaches to safety management.

Energy transition sector maturity

The energy transition sectors show varying levels of safety culture maturity, often influenced by their industry heritage and operational experience.

In the offshore wind sector, personal safety is generally proactive, benefiting from offshore oil and gas experience, as well as onshore wind operations. The approach to major accident hazards is calculative to proactive, with a growing recognition of the unique risks.

The solar sector generally lags offshore wind. Personal safety is reactive to calculative, with focus on immediate risks. Major accident hazard management is mainly reactive, often underestimating the potential severity, particularly around battery energy storage systems.

In the hydrogen sector, personal safety is generally calculative to proactive, drawing on industrial gas experience. The approach to major accident hazards is typically proactive, with high awareness of explosion risks and system controls.

While few (if any) organisations currently operate at the generative level in these sectors, the potential for development is significant. As the energy transition accelerates, more companies will likely recognise the business value of developing comprehensive, proactive safety cultures.

Conclusion

Understanding how organisations at different cultural levels think about personal safety versus major accident safety provides crucial insights for improvement. The progression from pathological to generative shows an evolution from ignoring risks to sophisticated risk management.

For energy transition sectors, this understanding is particularly crucial given their unique risk profiles. The challenge is to develop approaches that effectively address both personal and major accident safety while supporting the rapid growth these sectors require.

Success requires recognition that personal safety and major accident safety, while related, need distinct approaches. Organisations must develop the cultural maturity to handle both effectively, while maintaining appropriate focus on each type of risk.

The third article will round off the series by addressing the concept of safety as a value, and how it evolves as an organisation moves up the safety culture ladder.