From isolation to integration: Reconciling cyber security with operational safety in renewables 

The renewable energy sector is growing at an unprecedented rate, with offshore and onshore wind farms, solar power, and Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) playing key roles in meeting ambitious net-zero goals. As these technologies become increasingly connected and digitised, a critical tension has emerged: the complex interplay between cyber security and operational safety.

Cyber security experts aim to protect an energy system from the threats posed by people, while safety professionals work to protect people and infrastructure from the system’s own risks. Striking a balance between these two perspectives is essential to ensure that renewable energy projects operate efficiently, safely, and securely.

This article examines the conflicts between cyber security and operational safety in the renewable energy market. We explore how poor interfaces between these two domains can create significant vulnerabilities. We propose strategies to reconcile these competing needs through a holistic design risk management approach that ensures systems are simultaneously “secure” and “safe” by design.

Conflicting priorities – the tension between cyber security and safety

Cyber security experts and safety engineers have fundamentally different goals when it comes to protecting renewable energy systems.

Cyber security professionals are concerned with safeguarding systems against unwanted actions, either malicious or accidental, such as unauthorised access, data breaches, and malware attacks. They focus on vulnerabilities within digital networks, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, and Internet of Things (IoT) devices that monitor and control wind turbines, solar panels, and energy storage units. Their primary objective is to protect data and prevent external threats that could disrupt or shut down the energy supply. 

Conversely, safety professionals are focused on ensuring that these systems do not endanger human lives or physical assets. In operational safety, the aim is to prevent accidents, equipment failures, and hazardous conditions that could harm workers or cause asset damage. For example, in an offshore wind farm, safety functions aim to protect technicians from high-voltage equipment and extreme weather, while ensuring that wind turbines do not fail catastrophically.

These fundamentally different perspectives can lead to significant challenges. Cyber security measures often involve complex access controls, encrypted communications, and automated responses to security threats. These measures could complicate or restrict the operations of onsite workers or remote operators who need quick, simple access to control systems.

Meanwhile, safety measures that involve manual overrides, redundant systems, or open access for rapid intervention may inadvertently expose those same systems to cyber vulnerabilities. These conflicting priorities need to be carefully reconciled, particularly during the design phase of a project.

Safety by design versus secure by design

The principles of “safe by design” and “secure by design” represent two essential yet often competing approaches to system development, each focusing on protecting different aspects of critical infrastructure.

Safe by design is aimed at embedding safety features into the design such that the residual risks during the life of the asset are acceptably low. This includes, for example, ensuring that turbine blades are designed to withstand extreme conditions, as well as integrating fail-safe mechanisms into control systems. In contrast, secure by design focuses on embedding cyber security protections into these systems, ensuring they are resilient to hacking, data theft, or malicious shutdowns.

The problem arises when these two principles come into conflict during the design phase. One example of this conflict occurs when off-the-shelf (OTS) safety solutions are used to enhance safety but inadvertently introduce cyber vulnerabilities. In a typical solar farm project, safety engineers may introduce OTS devices, such as temperature sensors or fire suppression systems, to prevent overheating or fires. These systems can quickly detect faults or dangerous conditions, but many OTS devices lack robust cyber security protections.

For instance, such devices may run on outdated software or communicate over unsecured networks, making them easy targets for cyber attack. A hacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to gain access to the broader control system, potentially causing widespread disruptions. In this case, prioritising safety by adding OTS devices compromises the system’s overall cyber security, inadvertently creating a significant new risk.

Conversely, increasing cyber security can sometimes introduce safety risks. Take the example of restrictive access controls in an offshore wind farm. To secure the SCADA systems that control wind turbines, cyber security teams may implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) and strict access permissions. While these measures are essential for preventing unauthorised access, they can delay or limit the ability of onsite technicians to quickly intervene during an emergency. Imagine a technician needing immediate access to a turbine control system to prevent a mechanical failure or hazardous condition. If the technician must navigate multiple security barriers, like waiting for authentication codes or relying on network connectivity for MFA, it could delay their response, increasing the risk of an accident or damage.

In both cases, the pursuit of either safety or security creates vulnerabilities in the other domain. Safety engineers may prioritise physical protection at the expense of cyber security, while security professionals may select cyber controls to the detriment of safety. This illustrates the complex balancing act required to design renewable energy systems that are both safe and secure.

Human factor and information loss – a weak link between disciplines

One of the greatest challenges in reconciling cyber security and operational safety is the human factor. Specifically, the loss of crucial information due to poor communication between these two domains. Cyber security specialists have a deep understanding of network protocols and digital defences, while safety engineers are more concerned with mechanical failures and physical risks. As a result, they speak different technical languages.

The misalignment in objectives, expertise and language can lead to significant vulnerabilities, particularly in the fast-evolving renewables sector. For example, wind turbines are increasingly reliant on remote monitoring systems to diagnose faults and optimise performance. A cyber security measure may inadvertently limit the information available to an onsite technician required to safely perform repairs. Likewise, a safety override designed to shut down a wind turbine in an emergency could conflict with a cyber security protocol that interprets the sudden shutdown as a cyber threat, leading to cascading failures or false alarms.

In many cases, the systems designed to enhance safety or security are not user-friendly for the teams that operate them. For example, control interfaces might display cyber security warnings that operators misinterpret as system malfunctions, leading to unnecessary shutdowns or delayed responses. Similarly, cyber security professionals may overlook the real-world implications of an overly restrictive system, causing confusion or missed safety alerts when quick action is needed. These information gaps can create vulnerabilities that are easily exploited by attackers or lead to incidents due to basic human errors.

A relevant example within a BESS facility involves fire detection and suppression systems. In these systems, operators constantly monitor battery temperatures and other key indicators of thermal runaway, a condition that can lead to fires or explosions (see Ref. 1). However, cyber security controls can sometimes introduce additional complexity, such as automatic logging out of monitoring systems after a short period of inactivity, or masking real-time data to prevent external access. If an operator is logged out and does not immediately notice an alarm, or if key data are obfuscated for security reasons, this could lead to delayed responses in a potentially dangerous situation.

Moreover, operators may find themselves overwhelmed by excessive cyber security alerts, some of which could be “false positives” (warnings that incorrectly indicate a problem when no actual threat exists). This leads to the classic “cry wolf” scenario, where workers ignore important alarms due to the sheer number of such notifications they receive. At a BESS facility, ignoring or missing a legitimate temperature alarm or fire suppression activation could have catastrophic safety implications, putting both personnel and infrastructure at risk.

The future of integration – bridging the gap

The conflicts between cyber security and operational safety in renewable energy projects make it clear that neither “safe by design” nor “secure by design” can be fully justified in isolation. Attempting to optimise one at the expense of the other leaves critical vulnerabilities, as either safety is compromised for the sake of cyber resilience, or cyber security is weakened by prioritising operational accessibility. The only way to effectively reconcile these competing needs is through a holistic design risk management process that thoroughly assesses the impacts of all design decisions on both safety and security.

A comprehensive design risk management process should start early in the development of offshore wind farms, solar installations, and BESS projects. It requires cross-functional teams, including safety engineers, cyber security experts and operational personnel, working together to identify how each design element will affect both safety and security. By incorporating both perspectives right from the start of the project, it is possible to foresee potential conflicts and address them before they lead to compromises later in the project’s lifecycle.

Figure 1: Reconciling safety and cyber security

Reconciling operational safety and cyber security requires addressing four key areas of overlap, shown in Figure 1, as follows:

Comprehensive hazard and vulnerability identification: It is critical to perform thorough hazard identification, not just focusing on physical risks to people but also on cyber vulnerabilities that could compromise system integrity. This means safety engineers and cyber security professionals should work together to identify hazards that could affect both domains, by both contributing to the project’s conceptual, or coarse, HAZID studies. By treating security vulnerabilities as hazards and incorporating them into traditional hazard analysis methods, it becomes easier to develop design solutions that address both safety risks and security concerns.

Effective interface management: One of the main areas where safety and security overlap is at the interface between systems and people. Managing these interfaces effectively is crucial to ensuring that communication between all work packages is clear and actionable. This may involve improving how systems communicate with each other and how information is shared between departments. For example, real-time safety alerts could be designed to bypass certain security protocols during emergencies but in a controlled and traceable way, to ensure that cyber security measures do not prevent timely safety interventions.

Considered approach to industry standards and good practices: Following established industry standards and good practice guidelines is key to creating systems that are both safe and secure. Unfortunately, most standards produced by organisations such as the IEC or ISO, provide frameworks that focus predominantly on one domain. A pragmatic and proactive developer will therefore consider the optimum combination of standards that provides holistic safety and security for their projects throughout the lifecycle. For example, standards such as IEC 62061 for functional safety (Ref. 2) and ISO/IEC 27019 for information security (Ref. 3) are more commonly applied concurrently to create mutually assured compliance. This approach ensures that systems are designed in line with proven methodologies, reducing the likelihood of conflicts between safety and security requirements.

Design decision tracking: A robust design decision procedure is essential to ensure that safety and security concerns are considered at every stage of a project. All decisions, whether related to the installation of new hardware, software updates, or operational changes, should be documented along with their impacts on both safety and security. This transparency enables teams to trace potential vulnerabilities back to their source, ensuring that any safety compromises or security vulnerabilities are proactively addressed rather than discovered later through incidents or audits.

Conclusion

The renewable energy market is the key player in the transition to a low-carbon future, with wind power, solar power, and BESS playing pivotal roles. However, as these projects become more digitised and interconnected, the conflicts between cyber security and operational safety will only grow more pronounced.

The challenge lies in striking a balance that protects both the system from external threats and people from the risks posed by complex infrastructure. By adopting an integrated approach that brings cyber security and safety professionals into closer collaboration, and by designing systems with both safety and security in mind, the renewable energy sector can ensure a future that is not only sustainable but also safe and secure. Comprehensive hazard identification, effective interface management, concurrent standards compliance, and robust design decision tracking will be crucial in achieving this balance.

References 

1. Volts and vulnerabilities: Exploring the hazards of battery energy storage systems, Cairn Risk.
2. IEC 62061:2021, Safety of machinery – Functional safety of safety-related control systems.
3. ISO/IEC 27019:2024, Information technology — Security techniques — Information security controls for the energy utility industry.